Mature male African Savannah elephants are known to periodically enter a tem-1 porary state of heightened aggression called "musth," often linked with increased 2 androgens, particularly testosterone. Sexually mature males are capable of entering 3 musth at any time of year, and will often travel long distances to find estrous females.
because females may be in estrus at any time throughout the year, musth contests 30 can be observed in both the wet and dry seasons (Poole, 1987 (Poole, , 1989a . Females 31 in estrus prefer to be guarded by-and to allow matings with-musth males, and 32 sometimes actively resist mating attempts by non-musth males (Poole, 1989b) .
33
For a male of a given size, maximizing reproductive success involves balancing 34 multiple strategic considerations. The male could be more successful if it were in 35 musth during a period in which there is a larger number of females in estrus, but 36 would also benefit from avoiding competitions against larger males for access to those 37 females. A similar tradeoff exists once a male has entered musth and has to decide 38 where within the population's spatial range to seek estrous females; certain regions 39 are more likely than others to contain estrous females (Croze and Moss, 2011) , and 40 musth males will travel large distances searching for them (Croze and Moss, 2011; 41 Poole, 1989a; Barnes, 1982) . Moreover, a male of a given size must choose which 42 region to visit while taking into account the expected number of available females 43 against the likelihood of encountering a larger male. Finally, a male that engages 44 in a musth competition may also face the possibility of injury or death in the event 45 that the competition escalates into a more violent confrontation. An optimal musth 46 strategy may therefore need to balance the immediate benefit associated with musth 47 against the possibility that future benefits will be forgone if the male suffers a musth-48 related injury (Poole, 1989a; Slotow et al., 2000) .
49
The large number of strategic considerations involved, and the different time 50 horizons over which they are relevant, has prompted elephant observers to suggest 51 that an unusually complex and long-term perspective is necessary to model musth 52 behavior (for an example, see Poole et al. (2011)) , though no such model has thus far 53 been proposed. Here we develop a game-theoretic model that explores the effects of 
Model
Consider a population of male elephants that may choose to be located in any of 59 M different spatial areas at any time during a year, which is subdivided into N time 60 periods. In each of these periods, a male may choose whether to be in musth or not.
61
For i = 1, . . . , M and j = 1, . . . , N , let V ij represent the intrinsic value of an area i 62 during time period j in terms of mating opportunities (i.e., the expected number of 63 females that a male in area i could monopolize during time period j, given that he 64 defeats all musth competitors in the area).
65
We adopt the following additional assumptions:
receive for being in musth in area i during time period j, given that all other medium 114 males are using timing strategy ξ and spatial strategy q j while all other small males 115 are using µ and w j . Lastly, Γ L ,Γ M and Γ S are the number of large, medium and small 116 males in the total population, respectively. With these definitions, it can be shown 117 that E L , E M and E S have the following expressions (see Appendix A for details):
Methods
The payoff received by an individual in the above model is dependent on the 119 frequency of strategies adopted within the population. In an evolutionary context, 120 the process of natural selection would continually alter the frequency of strategies 121 adopted within the population until the population arrives at an evolutionarily stable 122 strategy (ESS); defined as a strategy which, when adopted by the population, cannot 123 be invaded by any other strategy (Maynard Smith, 1982; McNamara et al., 1997) .
124
The expected value formulas defined above are useful because, at an ESS, any 125 two viable space-time choices (i, j), (l, k) should have an equal expected payoff nard Smith, 1982) . Mathematically, E * (i, j) must be equal to E * (l, k) for all viable 127 choices of (i, j), (l, k), where * is either an L,M or S. Because musth males are unaffected by the musth strategies of smaller male sizes, an ESS can be found by 129 first numerically solving for the η and p strategies for which E L (i, j) = E L (l, k),
130
then finding the ξ and q strategies for which E M (i, j) = E M (l, k) taking the η and 131 p strategies from the large male population as environmental constants. Lastly, the
132
ESS is completed by finding the µ and w for which E S (i, j) = E S (l, k) while using the 133 η, p, ξ and q strategies from the large and medium male populations (for a further 134 description of the numerical process and a proof that the above algorithm will yield 135 an ESS, see Appendices C and D).
136
In the above model each size class has a spatial strategy (p j , q j and w j ) as well as 137 a timing strategy (η, ξ and µ). We define a spatial ESS for a given size class as the
138
ESS for the spatial subgame that arises when the timing strategy for the size class 
Parameter data
In a well-known field study of African elephants, Poole (1989a) separated adult 145 males living in Amboseli National Park (ANP) into 6 different age categories: 1A
146
(ages 10-14.9), 1B (ages 15-19.9 ), 2 (ages 20-24.9), 3 (ages 25-34.9), 4 (ages 35-49.9)
147
and 5 (ages 50+). Groups 1A and 1B were never observed mating, and therefore are 148 not considered relevant to the above model. Because male African elephants con-
149
tinue to grow until late in life (Poole, 1989a; Poole et al., 2011; Briffa et al., 2013) , 150 we assumed that the older age categories contained larger males, and therefore we 151 set Γ S equal to the number of males in category 2; we set Γ M equal to the number Poole (1989b) Additionally, Poole et al. (2011) Poole et al. (2011) data set, which is not consistent with the 172 assumption that "small" males are between the ages of 20 and 24.9. The addition of 173 younger males into the age set likely lowered the median observed musth duration
174
(meaning that 2 days is likely a lower bound for T S ), while Poole (1989a) suggests 175 that males under the age of 25 are unlikely to have a median musth duration over a 176 week (meaning that 7 days is a likely upper bound for T S ). A musth duration of 4 177 days was chosen as a midpoint between these two bounds.
178
To test the above model, we set the number of time periods in each year to 179 N = 12, and we chose M = 4 for the number of areas. To obtain V ij values, the 180 estrous females were assumed to be uniformly distributed in space, and therefore
181
V ij is proportional to the number of females in estrus during time period j. For and T S = 0.133 an ESS can be found numerically (as described in Appendix C).
186
For the purposes of discussion, the time periods are divided into a "wet sea-187 son" (January through to July) and a "dry season" (August through to December), 188 which were chosen to correspond with periods of high estrous female availability and 189 low estrous female availability, respectively. This seasonal designation differs from 190 wet/dry season categorizations based on rainfall, as precipitation often predicts es-191 trous female availability with a lag (Poole et al., 2011 ). Poole (1989a , for example, 
Results
The spatial ESS was to compete in each area with equal probability. The timing Predicted Probability of Musth Figure 1 : The observed proportion of estrous females by month as reported by Poole (1989b) (top left), the predicted equilibrium probabilities of being in musth by month for a large male (top right), medium male (bottom left) and small male (bottom right) with Γ L = 21, Γ M = 36 and Γ S = 42.
As can be seen in Figure 1 , predicted large-male timing strategies are broadly The observed proportion of estrous females by month as reported by Poole (1989b) (top left), the predicted equilibrium probabilities of being in musth by month for a large male (top right), medium male (bottom left) and small male (bottom right) using an increased large male population.
Some elephant populations suffer from heavy poaching activity, which dispropor-tionately affects the large male population. Therefore, understanding how a reduc-220 tion in the large male population will influence behavior in the general population is therefore the probability of estrus (Poole et al., 2011) . Similarly, a female that enters 241 estrus one year is unlikely to enter estrus again in the years that follow, meaning that 242 the number of estrous females available in an area one year will also be a function of 243 the number of females that had been in estrus during previous years (Moss, 2001) . 
253
The two simulations in Figure 4 show different basic patterns of behavior. 
267
In order to gauge the sensitivity of the computed ESS to further variation in the The observed proportion of estrous females by month as reported by Poole (1989b) (top), the predicted equilibrium probabilities of being in musth by month for a large, medium and small male with the shorter musth duration parameters (bottom three panels on left) and the predicted equilibrium probabilities of being in musth by month for a large, medium and small male with the longer musth duration parameters (bottom three panels on right). The model assumes spatial heterogeneity among estrous females. 
The Samburu population
The behavioral data on which the above model is based were drawn largely from 
Observed and predicted musth timing behavior
To empirically evaluate the above model, the predicted musth timing probabili-
298
ties were compared to musth timing data from Poole (1982) . Poole (1982) recorded 299 both estimated age and observed musth timing behavior in 23 male African Ele-300 phants sampled from a larger population over two years (1980) (1981) . Each male 301 was classified as either "large" or "medium" (no small males were sampled) using 302 the age classes described in the parameter data section, then were marked as ei-303 ther "in musth" or "not in musth" for each month. The resulting observed musth 304 distribution for 1980 is shown in Figure 8 . The observed musth behavior differs from the predicted musth behavior shown 306 in Figure 1 . However, the results in Figure 1 were computed using male popula-307 tion values from Poole (1989a) , which used data collected over a longer time frame if year-specific estrous female data would be more appropriate. The argument for 314 using aggregated data is that the model assumes male musth timing is contingent 315 on the expected rather than observed estrous female timing, so that using an average 316 of female timing behavior over a longer interval may be preferable (see Poole et al. 317 (2011) for a discussion of the "inherent stochasticity" of the factors influencing male (1987) . Estrous female data can be seen in Figure 11 .
Additionally, similar simulations were carried out using data from 1981, as shown 326 in Figure 10 . Note that no estrous female observational data were available for
327
November and December, and therefore the simulations assumed a value of 0 observed 328 estrous females because no estrous females were observed during surveys carried out 329 from July to October. The number of months for which the predicted musth probability can be rejected are be increased so that some of the medium sized males would be classified as small,
373
and some of the large males would be classified as medium sized.
374
The most important caveat, however, is that the numbers of expected estrous periods that coincide with peak estrous female availability (Poole, 1987 The model presented here predicts that large males will more frequently be in 
Injury Risk

390
The above model assumes that musth is costless, which is clearly a simplification.
391
One possible cost of musth is the risk of injury or death associated with musth . The injury risk model assumes that the probability of injury is dependent on the 395 size difference of the competing males. λ is the probability that a musth male will 396 be injured while competing against a musth male of equal size, β is the probability 397 a musth male will be injured competing against a musth male that is one size class 398 larger, while ω is the probability that a musth male will be injured competing against Poole (1989b) (top). The predicted equilibrium probabilities of being in musth by month for large, medium and small males assuming T L = 2.3, λ = 0.12, β = 0.15, ω = 0.18 (probability of injury increases as opponent gets bigger) and predicting T M = 0.742 and T S = 0.164 (1st column). The predicted equilibrium probabilities of being in musth by month for large, medium and small males assuming T L = 4, λ = 0.011, β = 0.015, ω = 0.02 (probability of injury increases as opponent gets bigger) and predicting T M = 1.583 and T S = 0.512 (2nd column). The predicted equilibrium probabilities of being in musth by month for large, medium and small males assuming T L = 2.3, λ = 0.2, β = 0.15, ω = 0.1 (probability of injury increases as the opponent's size approaches the size of the focal male) and predicting T M = 0.527 and T S = 0.205 (3rd column).
Discussion
Small male inconsistency
While the musth timing of medium and large males is generally consistent from 416 one year to the next, small males are less predictable and may enter and exit musth 417 multiple times in a single year (Poole, 1987 (Poole, , 1989a smaller non-musth males, and Poole (1982) suggests that the failure of small non-473 musth males to successfully mate with females is due more to the female's ability 474 to elude them then from musth male guarding. These non-musth mating attempts, 475 however, do sometimes succeed (Poole, 1989a) , and therefore the difference in musth 476 duration between large and small males could be determined by the relative difficulty 477 of pursuing a female versus defeating male musth competitors. likely to be the largest musth male at a given time will stay out of musth and instead 499 make non-musth mating attempts, but the same male will enter musth if he has a 500 reasonable probability of being the largest musth male in an area. There is evidence-from introducing young male elephants into a national park in 505 the absence of any older bulls, and later reintroducing older bulls-to suggest that the 506 duration of musth in small and medium males may be inhibited when the presence of 507 large males serves as an implicit threat (Slotow et al., 2000) . Similarly, males held in 508 captivity, where socially induced musth suppression is unlikely, will sometimes enter 509 musth at an earlier age than observed in the wild (Poole and Granli, 1989 ) and large 510 musth males have been observed harassing smaller musth males until they drop out 511 of musth (Poole, 1989a) . This evidence collectively suggests that, at least for small 512 and medium sized males, the optimal musth strategy is not simply to be in musth 513 for as long as is physiologically possible (as in the first explanation listed above), but 514 instead is determined by a trade-off between costs and benefits (Poole et al., 2011) .
515
The second and third possible explanations are similar in that they both require 516 evaluation from a life-history perspective. Poole (1989a) depicts two simulations where the probability of injury increases when the focal male 545 is significantly smaller than the opposing male (columns 1 and 2), and also depicts 546 a third simulation where the probability of injury increases when the opposing male 547 is of similar size to the focal male (column 3).
548
A life-history perspective could also be used to examine physiological costs, al-549 though such a model is not presented here. Females are more likely to enter estrus 550 during (or following) months with more rain (Poole, 1987; Poole et al., 2011) , pre- ical costs, the likely result would be to reinforce the tendency of the largest males to 562 enter musth during the rainy/high female time periods.
563
Once the large males have adopted a musth timing strategy focused on the wet 564 season, the behavior of the medium and small males is also likely to be similar to the 565 basic behavior predicted above. Medium males would be likely (barring unusually 566 low numbers of large males or implausibly high physiological costs) to avoid the larger 567 males by entering musth more frequently during the drier time periods, and small 568 males would thus probably enter musth during the wet season, competing against 569 the large males instead of the more numerous medium males.
570
A reasonable conclusion, therefore, is that for a given musth duration, the predic- adequately account for differences in musth duration.
578
The final possible explanation, that sexually active males choose between a musth 579 strategy and an alternative non-musth strategy, would also require a further model-580 ing effort to explore, and we do not undertake that here. There is, however, some that smaller sexually active males may find musth to be a less viable mating strat-591 egy relative to non-musth mating attempts. Furthermore, Poole (1982) cites data 592 suggesting that a low-ranking male is in fact more likely to obtain a copulation as 593 a non-musth non-guarder than as a musth male in situations where the available 594 estrous females are already monopolized by a high ranking male. This is because the 595 dominant musth male is more likely to allow the low-ranking male to get close to a 596 estrous female when the low-ranking male is not in musth. 
Other assumptions
In addition to the duration related assumptions, four other potentially problem-598 atic simplifications were made: There is no female choice, all males in an area must 599 compete with each other, non-musth males do not mate and all males of the same 600 size class use the same probabilistic strategy.
601
In fact, females solicit guarding behavior from musth males, produce low fre-602 quency calls to attract males during estrus and will sometimes flee from smaller non-603 musth males that attempt to mate with them (Poole, 1989b) . Females do, therefore, 604 influence mate selection, but the modeling simplification is nonetheless reasonable.
605
Firstly, musth is an honest signal of good condition (Poole, 1989b) , so although 606 female elephants will avoid smaller non-musth males they are less likely to avoid 607 musth males, which the model assumes are the only males that mate. Secondly, the 608 fact that females produce low frequency mating calls to attract males strengthens 609 the assumption that all musth males in an area compete with each other. Lastly,
610
females do solicit guarding behavior from large males, especially larger musth males,
611
but the likely result is to decrease the probability that a smaller musth male could 612 successfully mate without challenging any nearby larger musth male, which fits with 613 the modeled incentives of musth timing and spatial distribution.
614
The third assumption that males only mate while in musth is strictly false but, Finally, the fourth assumption that all males in a given size class use a single 627 probabilistic strategy is also false, but does not stop the model from capturing the 628 role of competition in forming musth strategies. A given male's musth timing strat-629 egy, rather than being probabilistic, can be remarkably consistent from one year to 630 the next, especially for larger males (Poole, 1989a) . Furthermore, differences in per-631 sonality, size for age and learned behavior may also influence aspects of the musth 632 strategy adopted by a given male (e.g. age of first musth) (Lee et al., 2013). However, 633 the model proposed here can still capture important aspects of musth behaviour.
634
Over the course of a given male's lifetime, his observed musth timing can move 635 into different time periods as the male grows older and larger (Poole, 1989a normally associated with large males increases.
667
Other scenarios could also be explored with regard to changes in land availability The value of γ, however, is dependent on the probabilistic strategies of the large 683 male population. To find the expected value of the payoff function, let there be γ L 684 large males in musth during time period j (including the invading male), the prob-685 ability that γ − 1 large musth males (each using the population spatial strategy p j )
686
are also in area i is then given by:
690
Thus the expected payoff a large musth male would receive in area i is:
The above summation is identical to the probability mass function for γ L Bernoulli 701 trials, except that the summation starts at j = 1 rather than j = 0. Therefore the 702 sum must be equal to 1 minus the j = 0 term, and the expected value becomes:
The above formula was derived assuming that there were γ L large males in musth 707 during period j. As, again, γ L is probabilistic, the expected value of the above for-708 mula must be found with respect to γ L . To find the expected value, note that the 709 focal male will be in musth during time period j, and let there be Γ L large males in 710 the total population. The probability that γ L − 1 other large males will also be in 711 musth is given by:
Therefore, the expected payoff to an invading large strategist going into musth 716 during time period j and visiting area i is:
Now, consider the two terms in the summation above, the first is:
Note that once again this is the probability mass function for Γ L Bernoulli trials,
733
without the γ L = 0 term. Therefore this summation is equal to one minus the term
Now consider the second term in the summation:
Evaluation of the next term employs the Binomial theorem, which states:
If i is replaced by γ L , n with Γ L , x with (η j − η j p ij ) and y with (1 − η j ), then the 747 binomial theorem without the i = γ L = 0 term is obtained. Therefore:
755
Combining these expressions gives:
yielding (1). Applying the above reasoning to small and medium males as well yields
760
(2)-(3).
761
Using the above payoff formula, a large male ESS can be found by numerically 762 solving E L (i, j) = E L (l, k) for all viable choices (i, j) and (l, k) subject to the con- classes gives a probability of injury of ω. If the focal male is larger than the opposing 823 male, the probability of injury to the focal male is 0. Because large males are assumed to be unaffected by injury risk, consider the 839 medium sized males. The probability that a given medium male is not injured by
840
another medium sized male in a particular time period, given that he has entered 841 musth and visited a particular area, must be calculated. If it is known that he will 842 face γ medium sized opponents, then his chances of surviving would be:
(1 − λ) γ (recall that λ is the probability that a male is injured while competing against a 847 male of the same size).
848
However, γ is not given, so the above value must be multiplied by the probability (1 − λ)
The above equivalence can be found by applying the binomial theorem, as in
859
Appendix A. This probability of survival, however, is conditional on there being γ M 860 males in musth during time period j (counting the focal male). This probability 861 must therefore be multiplied by the probability that there are in fact γ M males in 862 musth during time period j. Summing over all possible values of γ M then determines 863 the probability of survival for the focal male. This gives:
(1 − λξ j q ij ) Γ M −1 .
869
Once again the above equivalence is found by applying the binomial theorem.
870
Of course, a medium male must also consider the risk associated with competing 871 against large males. If a similar derivation against large opponents is applied, it is 872 found that a medium sized focal male's probability of surviving time period j in area (1 − λξ j q ij )
Where β is the probability that a focal male will be killed given that he is com-
878
peting against a musth male that is one size class above the focal male. For small 879 males the survival probability is given by:
Where ω is the probability a focal male will be killed given that he is competing 884 against a musth male that is two size classes larger.
885
To incorporate these probabilities into the payoff functions, expected future ben-886 efits must be added to the payoff expressions. For medium sized males, the expected 887 value of going to an area i during time period j is now given by: future benefits will be E next , if he enters musth, the sum will be E M (i, j). At a timing
899
ESS, these payoffs must be equal, thus a space-time ESS can be found by setting 900 E M (i, j) = E next = T E L = P L for all viable choices (i, j). Similarly, A space-time
901
ESS can be found for the small males by setting E S (i, j) = P L for all viable (i, j).
902
Before an ESS can be found, however, it must be considered that the number 903 of competitors that will be alive at any point in time will be in part dependent on 904 the musth strategies adopted by the general population. Let the probability that a 905 male survives time period j be denoted S j . If N < j < 2N + 1 (the male is medium 906 sized), this gives:
If 0 < j < N + 1 (the male is small), this gives:
To find the expected number of males alive in each time period, assume that 915 each year Γ S small males are added to the population, while the surviving small 916 males become medium sized, the medium males become large and the large males 
With this final set of payoff functions a lifetime history ESS can be found by 7.) Repeat steps 3-6 until E L (h, 1) = E L (l, 1), (or until p h1 = 1).
947
8.) Repeat steps 3-7 for each of the remaining phases.
949
Once step 8 is complete, the large male population will be at a spatial ESS dur-950 ing each phase. This spatial ESS, however, will be dependent on the timing strategy In order for η to be a timing ESS, we must have that an invading large male can-972 not have a higher yearly payoff with a different timing strategy when the population 973 is using η. This requires that E a = E b , ∀a, b (except possibly when η a or η b = 1 or
This quantity is a monotonically decreasing function of u ij . 
1001 1002 η j are defined at the beginning of this paper.
Let σ n = S 1 , S 2 , ..., S n−1 , S n+1 , ..., S Γ L be the modified population state.
Consider the modified population state σ m = V, V, ..., U, ..., V .
is a weak ESS.
